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1 Introduction
The question of the optimal number of firms in an industry has been the
focus of a vast amount of economics literature. This is due to the obvious
importance of the question. A thorough analysis increases our understanding
of the impact of barriers to entry, but it also guides competition policy how
to regulate (if at all) industries which are characterised by, for example,
economies to scale (as one reason for entry barriers, see Weizsa¨cker (1980)).
The early literature that researched into the optimality of free entry when
an industry is characterised by increasing returns to scale argued that there
will be excessive entry (see, for example Chamberlin (1933), Robinson (1933)
and Kaldor (1934)). The argument for this is that (monopoly) profits which
are generated by increasing returns, attract too many entrepreneurs such
that firms will become too small. The economy (and as such consumers)
cannot take full advantage of the scale economies.
This argument, however, only concerns the production side of the econ-
omy. More recently, the literature included the fact that consumers value
variety, see Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In these situation
it is ambiguous whether there will be excess entry or not.
Building on this latter strand of literature, Mankiw and Whinston (1986)
present a general model that clearly identifies the forces at work which cause
the deviation of the social optimum from the private one with free entry.
Two externalities drive a wedge between the private and social evaluation
of free entry: a business stealing effect (which is negative) and a product
variety effect (which is positive). Depending on which effect dominates, the
economy is characterised by too much or too little diversity (see for example
Vives (1999)).
A crucial assumption in the literature on the optimal number of variety
(and free entry) is that firms face frictionless input markets. Thus, the trade-
off between the number of firms and firm output is given by the resource
restriction of the economy. In real world economies, however, firms face
input markets which are characterised by a number of frictions. One of these
is the search and matching friction in the labour market. Before firms are
able to start producing (and hence can enter the industry), they have to
search for suitable workers. It is well known that this generates equilibrium
unemployment, see for example Pissarides (2000).
Far from clear is the relation between search unemployment and the op-
timal number of firms. The question comes up whether for example free
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entry would on the one hand result in a suboptimal number of firms, but
on the other hand would decrease unemployment or whether an increase in
monopoly profits to promote variety would come at the cost of additional un-
employment. Without taking unemployment into account results concerning
free entry and the optimal number of firms seem to be flawed.
In this paper, we amend a standard search unemployment model (see
for example, Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1986), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) and Pissarides (2000)) by a goods market structure which is charac-
terised by monopolistic competition and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) preferences.
Only few papers analyse search unemployment models which are charac-
terised by monopolistic competition. Our model is close to Ebell and Haefke
(2004) who analyse the impact of product market deregulation and endoge-
nous wage bargaining institutions to explain the different US European un-
employment experience and to Ziesemer (2005) who analyses the effects of
the digital revolution on unemployment. None of these papers, however,
addresses the issue of optimal product diversity and both have to rely on
the notion of multiple worker firms. This assumption indirectly implies that
firms are already equipped with optimal production capacity when entering
the market (see, for example Ebell and Haefke (2004)), but this seems to
be restrictive. Usually, new founded firms enter the market and simultane-
ously start looking for a suitable workforce. Thus, the assumption suppresses
channels through which the search friction may affect the choice of firms to
enter the market.
In our framework, we stick to the standard Pissarides (2000) assumption
of one worker firms. The presence of monopolistic competition only offers an
additional choice to firms. Either they they use their (fixed) production ca-
pacity to produce existing varieties or they sink some fixed costs and produce
a new variety. With this, the number of varieties as well as the quantity per
variety is endogenous.1 We can solve for the decentral equilibrium number of
varieties, the quantity produced per variety and the unemployment rate and
compare this to the social planer choice. Our main results are as follows:
1. Product diversity, i.e. the number of varieties, is either too small or too
large. This confirms the results found in the literature with frictionless
input markets.
1Due to the one-worker firm assumption, the number of firms is not equivalent to the
number of varieties as true in models without search frictions.
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2. The condition for the unemployment rate to be efficient, the so-called
Hosios (1990) condition, does not hold with an imperfectly competitive
goods market. However, we can show that the condition is nested in
our model for a competitive goods market.
3. Numerical simulations of the model suggest that production per variety
is too large. This result suggests that there will be, independently
of aggregate employment, over-employment in any variety producing
sector. This is due to a wage externality. Similar results are also found
in Ebell and Haefke (2004) and Smith (1999).
Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. Section 3 derives the
decentralised equilibrium and some comparative static results. Section 4
determines the social planner equilibrium given the labour market friction.
Eventually, section 5 compares the decentral and the central equilibrium and
analyses the question of optimal product diversity. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Labour Market
The modelling of the labour market closely follows the standard assumptions
in the literature, see e.g. Pissarides (2000) or Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
Firms offering vacancies and unemployed workers have to invest time to find
each other. Matching (i.e. finding the right counterpart) is driven by the
following (Cobb-Douglas) matching function:
M = UηV 1−η (2.1)
where M denotes matches, U is the number of unemployed and V is the
number of vacancies. The probability for an entrepreneur/firm to find a
suitable worker is:
M
V
=
(
U
V
)η
= θ−η, (2.2)
where θ ≡ V
U
, which is referred to as labour market tightness (as seen from
an entrepreneur’s point of view). The probability for an unemployed agent
to find a job is:
M
U
=
(
V
U
)1−η
= θ1−η. (2.3)
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Filled jobs (=employment) are destroyed at an exogenous rate s. The
number of all filled jobs in the economy is (L¯ − U), where L¯ denotes the
labour force. Thus, the inflow into unemployment is given by s(L¯−U). The
outflow of unemployment is θ1−ηU . The differential equation governing the
dynamics of the unemployment rate is given by:
dU
dt
≡ U˙ = s(L¯− U)− θ1−ηU (2.4)
Steady state unemployment is given by:
U =
sL¯
s+ θ1−η
(2.5)
2.2 Households
Households are characterised by the following love-of-variety utility function:
w = x0 +
(
n∑
i=1
xαi
) 1
α
, (2.6)
where xi denotes the amount of consumption of some variety i and x0 is some
outside good which is the nume´raire, hence p0 = 1.
2 Households are endowed
with one unit of labour and with one unit of the outside good.3 The budget
constraint of the household reads:
I = x0 +
n∑
i=1
pixi,
where I is the income stream of the household. Solving this maximisation
problem (see the appendix) yields the demand for a variety i of the monop-
olistic good
xi =
I − x0
q
[
pi
q
]1/(α−1)
, (2.7)
2Modelling the household utility in this quasi-linear way has become common in the
literature, see for example Pflu¨ger (2004) and the literature therein.
3Think of the outside good as being land. This shortcut simplifies our analysis since we
do not need a production sector for the outside good. We could also model this production
sector and all results would carry over as long as we assume labour only employed in the
monopolistic sector of the economy.
Comments Welcome 5
where q ≡
(∑n
1 p
α/(α−1)
i
)(α−1)/α
, which is the minimum expenditure for the
CES bundle of heterogeneous goods.4
Using this solution to the household’s optimisation problem, we can show
that utility of the household is linear in income. Hence, we are able to
determine the value of having a job E and the value of participating in the
labour market, but being unemployed and searching for a job S. The (steady
state) Bellman equation for having a job is given by:
ρEi = ωi + s(S − Ei), (2.8)
where i ∈ E, I depending on having a job in the established or the innovative
sector and ωI is the respective wage. There is no job specific human capital.
Every unemployed household has the same probability of finding a job. With
a zero unemployment benefit, the value of being unemployed is:
ρS = θ1−η(E − S), (2.9)
2.3 Firms
Firms consist of an entrepreneur who offers one vacancy. After having filled
this vacancy, the entrepreneur produces a fixed amount of output a of a
variety of the monopolistic good and sells this to the consumers.
Before the firm is able to produce it has to invest a flow amount φ of
the outside good in order to search for a suitable worker. Once the firm has
found the worker, it has to sink fixed costs in order to start production. The
amount of fixed costs depends on the choice of the firm in which ”sector” to
engage. The firm can sink an amount R (for example to buy a blueprint)
and start producing a new variety of the monopolistic good. In this case the
firm enjoys monopoly profits for one period. After the elapse of this period
other firms can produce additional amounts of this new variety. These firms
have to sink an amount δR (with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) to produce quantities of existing
varieties. Figure 1 offers a graphical illustration of the structure of the labour
4We do not consider any intertemporal aspects of the choice of households. However,
the same demand structure would occur in an intertemporal setting as long as households
are risk neutral, see for example Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984). Obviously, matters change in case the households are not risk neutral anymore,
see Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
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market and of firm behaviour.5
To determine the behaviour of entrepreneurs, we have to look at the
values of offering a vacancy, having a filled job and producing quantities of
an existing variety or being the monopolist and producing a new variety.
Let us turn to the value of offering a vacancy. Denoting this value W , the
Bellman equation determining this value is given by:
ρW = −φ+ θ−η (J I −W) , (2.10)
when planning to produce a new variety or
ρW = −φ+ θ−η (JE −W) , (2.11)
when entering an established industry. J I and JE denote the value of hav-
ing a filled job and producing a new variety or producing existing varieties
respectively. The value of offering a vacancy is the search costs plus the
probability weighted ”gain” of turning a vacancy into a filled job (i.e. the
option value). Since there is free entry into the labour market, vacancies will
be offered until W is zero. Using this it is easy to see that the following
holds:
J I = JE =
φ
θ−η
(2.12)
Thus, free entry for offering vacancies establishes a no-arbitrage situation.
Since every entrepreneur can freely choose in which sector to go, the values
of having jobs in either sector must be identical. By equation (2.12), the
lower bound for the value of having a job is given by expected search costs.
In general, the value of having a filled job slot are given by the following
Bellman equations:
(1 + ρ)J I = pi(a)a− ωI + (1− s)
(
JE
)−R, (2.13)
ρJE = pi(xi + a)a− ωE + s
(−JE)− δR. (2.14)
The producer of a new variety is the one period monopolist and gets the
higher monopoly price. However, once his patent expires (and the job is
not destroyed by the exogenous shock), the variety becomes established and
other firms can produce additional quantities. Thus, the former monopolist
5Note that with a downward sloping demand curve for any variety i the revenue of
producing a new variety is always larger than producing an existing one. However, fixed
costs are also higher making the production of an existing variety an attractive option.
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is in the same situation as a firm that has chosen to produce quantities of an
additional variety in the first place.
Solving these equations for J I and JE gives:
J I =
pi(a)a− ωI −R
1 + ρ
+
1− s
1 + ρ
pi(xi + a)a− ωE − δR
ρ+ s
(2.15)
JE =
pi(xi + a)a− ωE − δR
ρ+ s
(2.16)
2.4 Wage Bargaining
The wage will be endogenously determined by a bargain between the house-
hold and the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is only able to produce once a
wage agreement is settled. If no solution to the bargaining problem is found,
the household and the entrepreneur split up and both continue searching.6
Timing is of crucial importance for the bargaining result. When offering
the vacancy, the entrepreneur is free to choose in which sector she/he is going
to produce in the case the vacancy is filled. After meeting the suitable worker
(and before the bargaining starts), the firm invests the fixed costs depending
on the choice whether to produce quantity or variety. Once an agreement is
reached the worker-firm-pair can start to produce. If no agreement is reached
the entrepreneur can sell its equipment on a perfect second hand market and
continues searching.
Let us first consider the wage bargain between in the case the entrepreneur
has chosen to enter the established sector. Thus, the entrepreneur and the
household bargain the wage ωE. The solution to this bargaining is determined
by the following Nash product:
ΩE = (EE − S)ζ(JE)1−ζ , (2.17)
where ζ denotes bargaining power of the worker. The bargained wage in the
established sector will be given by (see the appendix A.2):
ωE = ζ(pi(xi + a)a− δR + θφ). (2.18)
6Note that due to the assumption of the single worker firm, we do not have to consider
intrafirm bargaining (and the problems associated with that) as e.g. analysed by Stole
and Zwiebel (1996) or Cahuc and Wasmer (2004).
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The wage for the situation in which the firm produces a new variety is
found by maximising the following Nash product:
ΩI = (EI − S)ζ(J I)1−ζ . (2.19)
We assume bargaining power of workers to be identical across sectors. This
is due to the fact that bargaining power is determined by the institutional
framework of the whole economy (organisation of the labour market etc.)
which is independent of whether the firm produces a new variety or only
additional quantities. Firms which produce new varieties pay the following
wage:
ωI = ζ(pi(a)a−R + θφ) (2.20)
The bargained wage in both ”sectors” of the economy distributes rents
between worker and entrepreneur. These rents are the saved search costs of
the firm and the monopoly rents when producing and selling output. These
rents, however, need not to be identical between firms which produce estab-
lished goods or new varieties. Thus, there might exist a wage differential
which is given by:
ωE − ωI = ζ((1− δ)R− (pi(a)− pi(xi + a))a). (2.21)
This wage differential is decreasing in the price differential and increasing in
the fixed cost differential. The effect of an increase in workers’ bargaining
power ζ depends on the sign of the net rent differential.
3 Decentralised Equilibrium of the Economy
In this section we solve for the decentral equilibrium in the economy and
present and discuss some comparative statics results. We focus on a symmet-
ric equilibrium. This means that every variety is produced by the identical
number m of firms such that the price of every variety is identical. Thus,
we have to solve for five endogenous variables: the amount of production of
a variety x, the number of varieties n, the labour market tightness θ (as a
proxy for offered vacancies), the price for any symmetric variety p and the
wage differential ωE − ωI . For the ease of exposition we will concentrate in
the following on the number of firms m instead of the amount of production
(although there is a one to one relationship of x = ma between these two
variables).
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We solve the model in three steps. First we equate the expression for J I
and JE. With this, we are able to determine the amount of production in a
sector of the economy.
p(a)a− ωI −R
ρ+ s
=
p(ma+ a)a− ωE − δR
ρ+ s
⇔ ωE − ωI = p(ma+ a)a− p(a)a+ (1− δ)R. (3.1)
Plugging in the wage differential given by equation (2.21) (remembering that
we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which xi = x = ma and pi = p) into
the no-arbitrage relation gives:
(p(a)− p(ma+ a))a = (1− δ)R, (3.2)
which says that in an arbitrage free equilibrium, the revenue difference be-
tween producing a new variety and an established one will be identical to the
difference in (sunk) costs. Equation (3.2) implicitly gives a relation between
the number of firms which produce quantity and the number of varieties.
This relation does not depend on labour market parameters such as bar-
gaining power, ζ, or alike. Labour market imperfection affects firms in a
symmetric way irrespective of whether they engage as an established or an
innovative producer, thus it does not affect the equilibrium allocation of re-
sources between the two uses.
Using the demand relations (A.11) and (A.12), this equation gives (see
the appendix A.1):
an
1−α
α m1−α(1− (1 +m)α−1) = (1− δ)R. (3.3)
The right-hand side of equation (3.3) is the additional cost of producing a new
variety and the left-hand side is the additional profit of being the monopolist
and producing a new variety. The latter is the revenue when being the
monopolist an
1−α
α m1−α adjusted for the price difference when compared to
the other sectors with m firms. Note that the excess profit when being
the monopolist is increasing in n as well as in m. This is due to the fact
that both increases consumer demand and hence, the price. Additionally, a
larger m will increase the incentive to be the monopolist, because it increases
competition in the established goods sector.
The no-arbitrage condition determines the allocation of entrepreneurs
with filled jobs between the two alternatives of producing some existing vari-
ety or producing a new one. In addition to this, we also have to determine the
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resource base which can be allocated between these two uses. The resource
base is determined by the unemployment rate and thus, by the amount of
vacancies which will be offered in the economy. The latter can be determined
by the following considerations.
Entering the market for varieties is free. As such, entrepreneurs will
continue offering vacancies until the expected profit of doing so is zero. This
will be the case as long as the value of a filled job, e.g. JE (or J I , remember
that both will be identical) equals expected search costs φ
θ−η . The free-entry
assumption constitutes the following condition (using for example JE):
p(ma+ a)a− ωE − δR
ρ+ s
=
φ
θ−η
. (3.4)
Plugging in equation (2.20) for the endogenous wage and using the expression
for the price given by the demand function yields:
p(ma+ a)a− ζ(p(ma+ a)a− δR + θφ)− δR
ρ+ s
=
φ
θ−η
⇔ n 1−αα ( 1
m
+ 1)α−1a =
ρ+ s
1− ζ (φθ
η) +
ζ
1− ζ φθ + δR. (3.5)
Equation (3.5) determines the equilibrium relation between the number of
existing product varieties (which governs the price which can be earned in the
monopolistic sector), the number of firms in every sector and labour market
tightness, θ. The relation between the number of firms (either producing
quantity or variety) and labour market tightness is positive. More firms
imply more production and thus an increase in households demand. This in
turn increases the profit of opening up vacancies.
The last equation which constitutes the equilibrium in the economy is
the resource restriction. This reads (1− u)L¯ = mn, where the left-hand side
is de facto endowment of the economy and the right-hand side is the usage
of resources. Using the expression for the steady state unemployment rate,
equation (2.5), the resource restriction reads:
nm =
(
1− s
s+ θ1−η
)
L¯. (3.6)
The three equations (3.3), (3.5) and (3.6) determine the three endogenous
variables n, m and θ of the system. Solving the model for the changes in the
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dR dδ da dρ ds dζ dφ dL
dm ? ? ? + + + + -
dn ? ? ? - - - - +
dθ ? ? ? - ? - - +
Table 1: Comparative Static Results
endogenous variables gives the comparative statics results shown in Table 1
(see appendix A.3.4 for the detailed solution). Let us briefly comment on
some of these comparative static results. An increase in the available re-
source base L¯ will on impact evenly increase the n and m. This gives rise
to a ”demand push” such that profit increases which leads entrepreneurs to
open up more vacancies. In addition to this producing new variety becomes
more attractive. Hence, employment (which is larger than before) will be
allocated towards producing more variety and less quantity. An increase in
the present value of search costs (increase in φ and ρ) decrease the number of
offered jobs and thus, decreases the de facto resource base. On impact variety
and quantity decrease evenly. However, the decrease in m makes producing
quantity relatively more attractive. Equilibrium quantity increases, whereas
variety decreases. Similar arguments hold true for an increase in worker’s
bargaining power ζ. This increases employment, but this is not evenly allo-
cated between quantity and variety. On the contrary, variety declines and
quantity increases.
An increase in the fixed costs of opening up a new firm (an established
firm), R (δ), decreases the number of entrepreneurs and hence, the number
of vacancies. Thus, variety and quantity would have to decrease. However,
the increase in R (δ) increases the incentive for producing quantity (variety).
It is ambiguous which one of these two effects dominates.7 The intuition
for the effects of a change in productivity, a, are quite similar albeit with
different signs.
The comparative static results reveal unemployment affects the quantity-
variety choice of the economy. An increase in unemployment does not lead to
7The effect of a reduction in R or δ has also ambiguous effects on labour market
tightness θ and as such on unemployment. This is especially interesting since some authors
(for example Dulleck et al. (2004) or Fonseca et al. (2001)) argue that reducing start-up
costs would lead to a decrease in unemployment. This needs not to be true when taking
the reallocation effects into account.
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a decline in both, quantity and variety. In fact, direct changes in the labour
market are transmitted very asymmetric into the goods market.
4 Centralised Equilibrium in the Economy
The decentral equilibrium which was derived in the previous section is char-
acterised by a number of externalities in the goods and in the labour market:
1. Congestion Externality: Additional entrepreneurs entering the market
and offering vacancies have a negative effect on the matching probabil-
ity of the already searching entrepreneurs.
2. Thick Market Externality: Additional entrepreneurs that offer vacan-
cies increase the probability of unemployed agents to find a job.
3. Business Stealing Externality: Entrepreneurs with production capac-
ity that choose to produce already existing varieties ceteris paribus
decrease the profit of the following entrepreneurs who want to produce
quantities of this good.
4. Love-of-Variety Externality: Entrepreneurs with production capacity
that choose to produce a new variety exert an externality on house-
holds by increasing welfare and on other entrepreneurs by increasing
the demand for their products.
The existence of these externalities drives a ”wedge” between the social opti-
mal and the decentral equilibrium. Up to now, the litearture has exclusively
focussed either on the effects of the labour market externalities (congestion
and thick market) or the effects of the goods market externalities (business
stealing and love-of-variety), see for example Mankiw and Whinston (1984)
and Hosios (1990). Our model offers an integrative framework to analyse
these externalities simultaneously. By analysing this model, we are in a
position to better understand how goods market and labour market effects
interact with each other.
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The social planner maximises the following social welfare function:8
SW =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
( n∑
i=1
xαi
) 1
α
+ x0
 dt. (4.1)
Every household owns one unit of the outside good. There are L¯ households
in the economy, thus the endowment of the economy with the nume´raire
resource is given by L¯. As such, the following resource restriction must hold:
L¯ = x0 + nR +mδR + φθL¯u.
Using this, social welfare in a symmetric equilibrium reads:
SW =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
n
1
αma+ L¯− nR−mδR− φθuL¯
)
dt. (4.2)
The control variables of the social planner in order to maximise welfare are
the number of varieties, n, the amount of production in one sector, m and
the number of vacancies (or the labour market tightness), θ. When choosing
these control variables, the planner has to take two restrictions into account.
First, the dynamic restriction concerning the evolution of unemployment
(unemployment is the state variable of the economy) and second the resource
constraint which constitutes a trade-off between quantity and variety. The
first restriction is given by:
U˙ = s(L¯− U)− θ1−ηU
which is identical to (2.4). Noting that U˙ = u˙L¯ and doing some simplifica-
tions, this reads:
u˙ = s(1− u)− θ1−ηu (4.3)
The latter restriction reads:
(1− u)L¯ = nm. (4.4)
The central planner faces an intertemporal problem of controlling the path
of unemployment and a static problem of allocating a given resource pool
8Note that we write the social planner problem as that of maximising an infinite utility
stream. We could also have done this for the households problem without changing any
of the previous results.
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between quantity and variety producing. The Lagrangean for solving this
problem reads (e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1991), sec. 10):
L = n 1αma+BuL¯−nR−mδR−φθu+µ2(s(1−u)−θ1−ηu)+µ3((1−u)L¯−nm),
(4.5)
where µ2 and µ3 are the marginal value of unemployment (which turns out to
be negative) and the marginal value of an additional resource, respectively.
With this, the first order conditions for this maximisation problem are:
∂L
∂θ
= −φuL¯− µ2(1− η)θ−ηu = 0, (4.6)
∂L
∂u
= BL¯− φθL¯− µ2(s+ θ1−η)− µ3L¯ = −µ˙2 + ρµ2, (4.7)
∂L
∂n
=
1
α
n
1−α
α ma−R− µ3m = 0, (4.8)
∂L
∂m
= n
1
αa− δR− µ3n = 0, (4.9)
∂L
∂µ2
= s(1− u)− θ1−ηu = 0, (4.10)
∂L
∂µ3
= (1− u)L¯− nm = 0. (4.11)
Using these conditions, we can derive three equations which resemble the
equilibrium determining equations in the decentralised economy (see ap-
pendix A.4). The first equation is:(
1
α
− 1
)
n
1
αma = Rn− δRm, (4.12)
which governs the allocation of a given resource pool (i.e. a given unem-
ployment rate) between producing quantities and varieties. The economic
intuition behind this condition is more easily seen when rewriting it, yield-
ing:  1αn 1α−1ma︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂w
∂n
−R
 = mn
n 1αa︸︷︷︸
∂w
∂m
−δR
 . (4.13)
With a given resource pool, m
n
denotes the costs of a marginal variety in
terms of quantity loss. Thus, the social planner wants to allocate resources
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between producing quantity and quality such that the net marginal gain of
-for example variety- (the left-hand side) equals the marginal costs of fewer
m in utility units. Or (in more familiar microeconomic terms) the reciprocal
of the net marginal utility equals the relative price.
Using the two conditions for the dynamic constraint, (4.6) and (4.7) yield
the following condition for the optimal choice of θ:
B + θη +
η
ρ+ s
θ =
1− η
ρ+ s
µ3, (4.14)
Plugging in µ3 from the system of first order conditions eventually gives:
θη
φ
1− η +
φ
ρ+ s
η
1− ηθ +
1
ρ+ s
m−1R =
1
ρ+ s
(
1
α
n
1
α
−1a
)
. (4.15)
This equation corresponds to the free-entry condition in the decentral equi-
librium. It governs, as in the decentralised economy, the number of vacancies
that will be offered. It states that the social planner should offer vacancies
(and as such decrease unemployment) until the marginal costs of decreasing
unemployment (the left-hand side) equals the marginal gain (the right-hand
side). The marginal gain of lower unemployment is the net marginal utility of
either producing more quantity or more variety. The marginal costs consist
of the instantaneous costs plus the present value of the stream of expected
future search costs.
Since the central planner faces the same structure and restrictions as the
decentral economy, the resource constraint is identical in both cases and given
by (1− u)L¯ = mn. This closes the model. Hence, we have -as before- three
equations in three endogenous variables, i.e. n, m and θ.
5 Central Planer vs Decentralised Economy
The model we have presented is not analytical solvable in levels. This is true
for the decentral as well as for the social optimum. Thus, when comparing
these two situations, we have to stick to an indirect strategy, namely relying
on pathologic situations and numerical simulations.
In the following we will first of all focus on two polar cases namely one
in which the goods market externalities vanish and the other one in which
this is true for the labour market externalities. This (simplifying) approach
allows to analyse the differences between the decentral and the social planner
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optimum one by one and we are able to compare these results with the exist-
ing literature on the optimality of the search equilibrium and the optimality
of product diversity within a framework of monopolistic competition. In a
second step we will present the results of some numerical simulations of the
model with all externalities at work. This analysis depicts the effects of the
externality interaction and contrasts this situation with the one of the polar
cases.
Consider an economy in which α = 1 and R = 0, i.e. entrepreneurs do
not face any set-up costs when producing goods (other than searching for
the suitable match) and the substitutability between different good varieties
is infinite. This implies that entrepreneurs produce a homogenous good and
it does not matter whether they choose to produce an established or a new
variety. This is the situation which resembles the standard search model of
Pissarides (2000). Notice that in this situation the number of firms is indeter-
mined (and irrelevant) as is the case in the standard textbook model. There
are no externalities related to goods market imperfections in this economy.
How about the efficiency of the unemployment rate? Using (3.5) and (4.15)
it is easy to see that labour market tightness is identical in both situation as
long as η = ζ. This is the well known Hosios (1990) condition. If the bar-
gaining power of workers is equal to the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to vacancies, the negative externality of opening up a vacancy
(crowding externality) and the positive thick market externality just cancel
out. The number of vacancies will be optimal and so will be the equilibrium
rate of unemployment.
Let us now turn to the goods market externality. Consider an economy
in which there are no labour market externalities. This would be for example
the case if s = 0. Thus, there are no separations of matched worker-firm pairs
and the steady state unemployment rate is zero. The externalities stem from
the imperfections in the goods market and hence from the decision of firms
whether to produce new or established varieties. This raises the question of
how diversity in the decentral case differs from optimal diversity. Since we
implicitly assume a full-employment situation, the economy will always be
restricted to be on the resource constraint L¯ = mn irrespectively of whether
the market or the social planner determines the allocation. Assume for the
sake of exposition that δ = 0, i.e. no fixed costs have to be sunk when
producing established varieties.
Optimum product diversity is given by the solution of (using equation
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(4.12) and the resource constraint):(
1
α
− 1
)
n
1
α
−1 L¯
n
a︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(n)
= R
whereas product diversity in the decentral case is given by (using (3.3) and
the resource restriction):
an
1−α
α
((n
L¯
)α−1
−
(n
L¯
+ 1
)α−1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(n)
= R. (5.1)
Equation (5.1) is not analytically solvable for the optimal number of different
products. As such, when comparing optimal product variety in the central
and the decentral case, we have to stick to an indirect argument. Using the
properties of f(n) and g(n) we can state the following:
Proposition 1 If α < 0.5, equilibrium variety in the decentral case will be
smaller than in the social optimum.
Proof. In the appendix it is shown that for α < 0.5, g′(n) > f ′(n) > 0.
Both functions have the same limiting behaviour, thus g(n) > f(n). Hence,
equilibrium variety in the decentral case nd(= g−1(R)) is smaller than socially
desirable ns(= f−1(R)).
Figure B depicts equilibrium variety in the decentral and social planner
situation for different degrees of α. Note that α < 0.5 is a sufficient condition
for the decentral optimum to produce too few varieties. With α exceeding
0.5, however, product variety could be too small, optimal or even too large.
Economically, this result says that if households value variety very much
(indicated by the parameter α), the social value of an additional variety pro-
ducing firm will always exceed the private value plus the negative externality
in form of the business stealing effect. Once the social value of variety is
small enough (α > 0.5) it is ambiguous whether the positive dominates the
negative externality.
This result concerning social optimal and equilibrium product diversity in
an economy without unemployment complements the results already derived
in the literature (see for example Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or
Whinston and Mankiw (1986)). These papers show that depending on the
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form of the utility function equilibrium variety may be too small, too large
or the effect is ambiguous.
However, the interesting question which, to our best knowledge, has not
been analysed in the literature so far is whether there is an interplay be-
tween the optimality condition for unemployment and product variety. For
example it would be interesting to know whether the Hosios condition for
optimal unemployment still holds once we allow for monopolistic competi-
tion or whether there exists a trade-off between optimal unemployment and
diversity and both goals cannot be achieved simultaneously.
The strength of the presented model lies in the fact that all these questions
could be addressed, however since the model is not analytically solvable,
we have to rely on simulations to get an understanding of optimal product
diversity and unemployment. In the following we present the results of the
simulation of four different scenarios. These scenarios differ with respect to
the assumed parameter vector.9 Table 2 gives the different parameters in the
analysed scenarios.
Scenarios 1 and 2 assume the Hosios condition to hold (i.e. with competi-
tive labour markets, unemployment would be efficient), but consider different
α, hence, these scenarios compare situations in which the heterogeneity of
product varieties differs.
Scenarios 3 and 4 assume moderate degrees of heterogeneity, however,
they analyse the effects of differences in the bargaining power of workers. This
only affects the decentral equilibrium but comparing these two scenarios gives
a feeling of how bargaining power affects the labour and the goods market
and how this relates to the central planner optimum.10
η ρ s φ L¯ a α δ ζ
Scenario 1 0.5 0.05 0.15 0.1 1 1 0.95 0 0.5
Scenario 2 0.5 0.05 0.15 0.1 1 1 0.75 0 0.5
Scenario 3 0.5 0.05 0.15 0.1 1 1 0.8 0 0.1
Scenario 4 0.5 0.05 0.15 0.1 1 1 0.8 0 0.9
Table 2: Parameter Vectors for Different Scenarios
9The choice of the parameters basically follows the choices in the literature, see e.g.
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2005) and the literature given there.
10The scenarios we have chosen are only examples for the range of questions which could
be addressed within this framework.
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Using these parameters, we can calculate equilibrium and optimum quan-
tity, diversity and unemployment. This is done in table 3.11 These results
Scenario n m u
Social Planer 1 0.231466 4.10423 5 %
Decentral Equilibrium 1 0.0102244 92.489 5.44 %
Social Planer 2 2.0152 0.47502 4.27 %
Decentral Equilibrium 2 0.592793 1.59267 5.59 %
Social Planer 3 1.26334 0.754588 4.67 %
Decentral Equilibrium 3 0.438468 2.2348 2 %
Social Planer 4 1.26334 0.754588 4.67 %
Decentral Equilibrium 4 0.345983 2.42792 16 %
Table 3: Results for the Different Scenarios
concerning the equilibria in the different scenarios offer some interesting re-
sults. Consider scenario 1 in which the Hosios condition holds and product
heterogeneity is small (α = 0.9). As was already suggested in the previous
analysis, the unemployment rate in the decentral case will be close to the
optimal rate. However, the allocation of the labour pool between variety and
quantity is distorted. The decentral economy produces far too much quantity
and too few varieties, although the ”love for variety” of households is rather
small. The intuition for this is that the private costs of producing quantity
are smaller than the social costs. Before a matched entrepreneur-worker pair
can produce additional quantities, another entrepreneur must have invested
the sunk investment costs R to establish this additional variety. The en-
trepreneur does not internalise this positive spill-over effect, but the social
planner does. The distortion increases as α decreases, since in addition to
the wedge between private and social costs of producing quantity, also the
wedge between the private and the social value of variety grows larger.
But not only the quantity variety choice will be distorted but also the
unemployment rate will be larger than optimal. This is due to the fact
that with more firms producing quantities, the profit of a filled job declines
which in turn decreases the number of entrepreneurs (=vacancies). Thus the
11All results have been computed using Mathematicar 5.1. The Notebooks are available
from the author upon request. Note that, as in the whole paper, we do not impose any
integer constraints on m or n.
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unemployment rate will be too large. Since the Hosios condition holds, the
distortion in the labour market is a direct consequence of the goods market
imperfection.
Scenarios 3 and 4 demonstrate the effect of an increase in the bargaining
power of workers ζ. A change leaves the social planner optimum unchanged,
however it has some drastic effects on the goods and labour market situation
in the decentral optimum. As expected, the unemployment rate increases.
This is due to the fact that with a higher bargaining power, workers cap-
ture a larger part of the rent of a filled vacancy. As such, it will ceteris
paribus become less attractive to offer vacancies. But not only the labour
market is affected by a change in bargaining power, but also the allocation
of resources between quantity and variety. With a higher bargaining power,
entrepreneurs would rather produce additional quantity than additional vari-
ety. This is due to a standard hold-up effect. When producing a new variety,
the entrepreneur has to sink some fixed costs R before bargaining takes place.
The worker exploits this hands tying by bargaining higher wages. This effect
becomes more pronounced as bargaining power increases. Thus, the incen-
tive to produce new variety declines. An interesting point in this context is
that employment declines by a smaller amount than the number of varieties.
But this implies that (as can be seen from the table) quantity increases.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have integrated monopolistic competition into an otherwise
standard search model of the labour market. Entrepreneurs not only have
the choice of whether to open up a vacancy or not, but also whether to
produce additional quantities of an established good or a new variety. With
this structure we are able to analyse the labour market effects of imperfect
competition without dropping the one firm-one worker assumption of the
Pissarides (2000) search model.
Using this model, we were able to derive some comparative static results
on the effects of for example a change in bargaining power, a change in search
costs or a change in the size of the economy not only on unemployment, but
also on the quantity-diversity choice of the economy.
Inherited by its basic building blocks, the model we consider is charac-
terised by a number of (positive and negative) externalities in the goods as
well as in the labour market. The question comes up which effect this has
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on the decentral equilibrium compared to the social planner optimum and
whether there is interaction.
To analyse this question we have derived the social planner solution of
the model. Due to the fact that both equilibria, the decentral as well as
the social planer’s are not analytically solvable, the analysis has to rely on
special cases and on a number of simulations.
We were able to show that for the two polar cases in which either the
goods or the labour market imperfection vanishes, the model generates the
same results and conditions concerning optimality as already derived in the
literature. Thus, the standard models are nested in our model making it
more general and as such better suited to analyse various policy questions.
In addition to this, we are able to analyse possible interaction between goods
and labour market externalities.
We solve the model numerically for a set of different scenarios, i.e. pa-
rameter vectors. The scenarios differ with respect to the strength of the
goods and the labour market imperfection. The results of the different sim-
ulations reveal some interesting points. As the goods market becomes less
competitive (measured by the degree of heterogeneity of product varieties)
the optimum and the decentral number of product variety converge whereas
we observe divergence for the unemployment rate. An increase in bargaining
power of workers has large effects on the difference between the optimal and
the decentral unemployment. Its effect on the goods market is rather small.
Thus, the different externalities have different ”cross market” effects.
Monopolistic competition has become a basic framework for analysing a
broad range of economic issues (see for example Brakman and Heijdra (2004))
and is applied in many different fields in economics. However, up to now
search unemployment has not been part of the ”monopolistic competition
revolution” although search frictions are an important feature of many real
world labour markets. Thus, the presented model not only yields interesting
results concerning the divergence of decentral and central equilibrium, but
also offers a basic framework for extending the vast literature which builds
on monopolistic competition (endogenous growth theory, new trade theory,
new economic geography and so on) by search unemployment. This will make
the results from these models richer and presents a fruitful avenue for further
research.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Households Maximisation Problem
This is solved using the following Lagrangean:
L = w + µ1
(
I −
n∑
i=1
pixi − x0
)
(A.1)
yielding the first order condition:
∂L
∂xi
= (w − x0)1/(1−α)xα−1i − µ1pi = 0 (A.2)
∂L
∂x0
= 1− µ1 = 0 (A.3)
Deriving the demand function for a variety i:
(w − x0)(1−α)xα−1i − pi = 0 (A.4)
⇔ xα−1i =
1
(w − x0)(1−α)pi (A.5)
⇔ xi =
(
1
(w − x0)1/(1−α)pi
)(α−1)
⇔ xipi =
(
1
(w − x0)(1−α)
)(α−1)
(pi)
α/(α−1)
⇔
n∑
1
xipi =
(
1
(w − x0)(1−α)
)(α−1) n∑
1
(pi)
α/(α−1)
Plugging this in gives:
xi =
(pi)
1/(α−1)∑n
1 (pi)
α/(α−1)
n∑
1
xipi (A.6)
Using these first order conditions for optimal consumption, we can derive
the minimum expenditures for a bundle of the monopolistic good (
∑n
1 x
α
i )
1
α :
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xi =
(pi)
1/(α−1)∑n
1 (pi)
α/(α−1)
n∑
1
xipi (A.7)
⇔ xαi =
(
(pi)
1/(α−1)∑n
1 (pi)
α/(α−1)
n∑
1
xipi
)α
⇔
n∑
1
xαi =
( ∑n
1 xipi∑n
1 (pi)
α/(α−1)
)α n∑
1
(pi)
α/(α−1)
⇔
(
n∑
1
xαi
) 1
α
=
∑n
1 xipi∑n
1 (pi)
α/(α−1)
(
n∑
1
(pi)
α/(α−1)
) 1
α
Thus, minimum expenditures for one bundle are given by:
q =
(
n∑
1
(pi)
α/(α−1)
)(α−1)/α
(A.8)
With this, we can rewrite the demand function as:
xi =
I − x0
q
[
pi
q
]1/(α−1)
⇔ xi =
(
n∑
i=1
xαi
) 1
α [
pi
q
]1/(α−1)
(A.9)
where we took advantage of the fact that the households spends all of her/his
income. The demand function hence reads:
pi = q
(
xi
(
∑n
i=1 x
α
i )
1
α
)α−1
, (A.10)
Using this, we are in a position to determine the price of a firm starting to
produce a new variety (in a symmetric situation in which aggregate variables
are assumed constant) and a firm which produces additional quantities of a
variety:
p(a) =
(
1
n
1
αm
)α−1
(A.11)
and (remember that due to the assumed utility structure q = 1 must hold)
p(ma+ a) = p((m+ 1)a) =
(
(m+ 1)
n
1
αm
)α−1
. (A.12)
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A.2 The Wage Bargain
A.2.1 Existing Varieties
Maximising the Nash product w.r.t. the wage and taking into account that
the value of having a job and the value of having a filled vacancy are (linear)
functions of ωE,12 we get:
∂ΩE
∂ωE
= ζ(EE − S)ζ−1JE1−ζ − (1− ζ)(EE − S)ζJE−ζ = 0 (A.13)
⇔ ζ(EE − S)−1 − (1− ζ)JE−1 = 0 (A.14)
⇔ (1− ζ)(EE − S)− ζJE = 0. (A.15)
Remember that JE = pi(xi+a)a−ω
E−δR
ρ+s
and EE = ω
E+sS
ρ+s
. Plugging this in
gives:
(1− ζ)(ω
E + sS
ρ+ s
− S)− ζ pi(xi + a)a− ω
E − δR
ρ+ s
= 0 (A.16)
⇔ (1− ζ)(ωE − ρS)− ζ(pi(xi + a)a− ωE − δR) = 0 (A.17)
⇔ ωE = ζ(pi(xi + a)a− δR) + (1− ζ)ρS. (A.18)
Thus, workers get a fraction of the monopoly rent plus a fraction of their
outside option (i.e. the flow value of being unemployed). This expression
can be simplified further (see, Pissarides (2000)). With the bargained wage,
the following holds: EE − S = ζ
1−ζJ
E. The value of being unemployed is
given by (using 2.9): ρS = θ1−η ζ
1−ζJ
E. With this the bargained wage is
given by:
ωE = ζ(pi(xi + a)a− δR) + (1− ζ)(θ1−η ζ
1− ζ J
E) (A.19)
⇔ ωE = ζ(pi(xi + a)a− δR) + ζθφ (A.20)
⇔ ωE = ζ(pi(xi + a)a− δR + θφ). (A.21)
The wage is a fraction of the rents which accrues to the firm plus a fraction
of search costs.
12This is due to the implicit assumption that worker-firm-pair bargain the wage sepa-
rately for every period.
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A.2.2 New Varieties
Maximising the Nash product w.r.t. the wage and taking into account that
the value of having a job and the value of having a filled vacancy are (linear)
functions of ωI , we get:
∂ΩI
∂ωI
= ζ(EI − S)ζ−1J I1−ζ + (1− ζ)(EI − S)ζJ I−ζ = 0 (A.22)
⇔ ζ(EI − S)−1 − (1− ζ)J I−1 = 0 (A.23)
⇔ (1− ζ)(EI − S)− ζJ I = 0. (A.24)
Remember that J I = pi(a)a−ω
I−R
1+ρ
+ 1−s
1+ρ
JE and EI = ω
I+sS
s+ρ
. Plugging this in,
gives:
(1− ζ)(ω
I + sS
ρ+ s
− S)− ζ
(
pi(a)a− ωI −R
1 + ρ
+
1− s
1 + ρ
(ρ+ s)JE
)
= 0
(A.25)
⇔ (1− ζ)(ωI − ρS)− ζ
((
pi(a)a− ωI −R
) ρ+ s
1 + ρ
+
1− s
1 + ρ
(ρ+ s)JE
)
= 0
(A.26)
⇔ ωI = ζ
1 + ρ− ζ(1− s)
(
(pi(a)a−R)ρ+ s
1 + ρ
+
1− s
1 + ρ
(ρ+ s)JE
)
+
1− ζ
1 + ρ− ζ(1− s)ρS.
(A.27)
With the bargained wage, the following holds EI − S = ζ
1−ζJ
I . Thus the
value of being unemployed is given by: ρS = θ1−η ζ
1−ζJ
I . Using all this, the
bargained wage is:
ωI =
ζ
1 + ρ− ζ(1− s)
(
(pi(a)a−R)ρ+ s
1 + ρ
+
1− s
1 + ρ
(ρ+ s)JE
)
+
1− ζ
1 + ρ− ζ(1− s)
(
θ1−η
ζ
1− ζ J
I
) (A.28)
⇔ ωI = ζ
1 + ρ− ζ(1− s)
(
(pi(a)a−R)ρ+ s
1 + ρ
+
1− s
1 + ρ
(ρ+ s)JE + θφ
)
(A.29)
(A.30)
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The wage in the monopoly situation is consists not only a part of the actual
monopoly profits and the search costs, but also of the value of having a job
when loosing the patent. This is because an agreement today implies the
option of getting the value JE in the next period. The worker is able to get
a part of this value. With this, the wage bargained with the new variety
producing firm is a function of the wage of a quantity producing firm.
In a Nash equilibrium, in which the following holds 1−s
1+ρ
(ρ + s)JE =
1−s
1+ρ
((1− ζ)(pi(xi + a)a− δR)− ζθφ) , the bargained wage in the new va-
riety producing firm is given by:
ωI =
ζ
1 + ρ− ζ(1− s)
(
(pi(a)a−R)ρ+ s
1 + ρ
+
1− s
1 + ρ
(1− ζ)(pi(xi + a)a− δR))
)
+
ζ
1 + ρ
θφ.
(A.31)
A.3 Equilibrium Determining Equations
A.3.1 The no-arbitrage Relation
Totally differentiating the no-arbitrage relation (3.3) gives:
a1dm+ a2dn+ a3da = a4dR− a5dδ, (A.32)
where the coefficients are given by:
a1 ≡ 1−αm (1− δ)R + an
1−α
α m1−α(1− α)(1 +m)α−2 a2 ≡ 1−αα (1−δ)Rn
a3 ≡ (1−δ)Ra a4 ≡ (1− δ)
a5 ≡ R
A.3.2 The free-entry condition
Totally differentiating the free entry condition (3.5) gives:
b1dm+ b2dn+ b3da = b4dζ + b5dφ+ b6dR + b7dδ + b8ds+ b9
s
ρ
dρ+ b10dθ,
(A.33)
where the coefficients are given by:
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b1 ≡ (1− α)m−2
(
1 + 1
m
)α−2
n
1−α
α a b2 ≡ 1−αα n
1−α
α
−1 (1 + 1
m
)α−1
a
b3 ≡ n 1−αα
(
1 + 1
m
)α−1
b4 ≡ 1(1−ζ2) ((ρ+ s)φθη + φθ)
b5 ≡ ρ+s1−ζ θη + ζ1−ζ θ b6 ≡ δ
b7 ≡ R b8 ≡ ρ1−ζφθη
b9 ≡ sρb8 b10 ≡ ρ+s1−ζφηθη−1 + ζ1−ζφ
A.3.3 The resource constraint
Totally differentiating the resource constraint (3.6) reads:
c1dm+ c2dn = −c3ds+ c4dθ + c5dL¯, (A.34)
where the coefficients are given by:
c1 ≡ n c2 ≡ m
c3 ≡ s+θ1−η(1−s)(s+θ1−η)2) L¯ c4 ≡ s(s+θ1−η)2 (1− η)θ−η
c5 ≡
(
1− s
s+θ1−η
)
A.3.4 Equilibrium
Stability Before turning to the comparative static analysis, let us first
consider the stability of the equilibrium. It turns out that these stability
considerations are of major importance for the comparative static results.
Equations (3.3), (3.5) and (3.6) implicitly determine the equilibrium val-
ues n0, m0 and θ0. The equations are replicated here for convenience:
an
1−α
α m1−α(1− (1 +m)α−1)− (1− δ)R︸ ︷︷ ︸
fn(m,n)
= 0, (A.35)
n
1−α
α (
1
m
+ 1)α−1a−
(
ρ+ s
1− ζ (φθ
η) +
ζ
1− ζ φθ + δR
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fθ(m,n,θ)
= 0, (A.36)
(
1− s
s+ θ1−η
)
L¯−mn︸ ︷︷ ︸
fm(m,n,θ)
= 0. (A.37)
Assume such an equilibrium solution exists. The economy starts from this
equilibrium and there is some exogenous shock which moves the economy
Comments Welcome 31
away from the initial equilibrium. The question arises how plausible adjust-
ment paths of the endogenous variables look like once the economy is out of
its equilibrium. We consider the following form:
dn
dt
= hn(fn), (A.38)
dθ
dt
= hθ(f θ), (A.39)
dm
dt
= hm(fm), (A.40)
where hi are some arbitrary sign-preserving functions.
Equation (A.38) says that as long as net profit gain for being the monop-
olist producing a new variety (fn > 0) there will be new firms which produce
additional variety, n increases. Equation (A.39) argues that as long as the
gain for opening a vacancy is positive (f θ > 0), new entrepreneurs offering
additional varieties enter the market. Equation (A.40) shows that if resource
supply exceeds demand (fm > 0), the number of quantity producing firms
increases.
In order to analyse the stability of the adjustment path, we first of all
linearise equations (A.38)-(A.40) around some initial equilibrium (m0, n0, θ0).
The linearised system reads:
dn¯
dt
= hn(0) + hn′(0) (a1m¯+ a2n¯) , (A.41)
dθ¯
dt
= hθ(0) + hθ
′
(0)
(
b1m¯+ b2n¯− b10θ¯
)
, (A.42)
dm¯
dt
= hm(0) + hm′(0)
(−c1m¯− c2n¯+ c4θ¯) . (A.43)
Note that with hi(0) = 0 and zi ≡ hi′(0) > 0 the characteristic equation for
the above given linearised system is:∣∣∣∣∣∣
zna1 − λ zna2 0
zθb1 z
θb2 − λ −zθb10
−zmc1 −zmc2 zmc4 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0,
where this is given by:
−λ3 + λ2∆1 − λ∆2 + zmznzθ∆3 = 0, (A.44)
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dR dδ da dρ ds dζ dφ dL
dm ? ? ? + + + + -
dn ? ? ? - - - - +
dθ ? ? ? - ? - - +
Table 4: Comparative Static Results Appendix
and the coefficients are given by:
∆1 ≡ (c4zm + a1zn + b2zθ) > 0,
∆2 ≡ (zmznzθa1b10c2 + a1c4zmzn + b2c4zmzθ + a1b2znzθ) > 0,
∆3 ≡ (a1b2c4 + a2b10c1 − a1b10c2 − a2b1c4) T 0.
Without doing deeper analysing the roots of the characteristic equation
(which is not our primal goal in this analysis) we can state that a necessary
condition for the adjustment path to be stable is ∆3 < 0 (see e.g. Gandolfo
(1997)).
Comparative Statics The three equations (A.32)-(A.34) constitute the
following equilibrium system:a1 a2 0b1 b2 −b10
c1 c2 −c4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·
dmdn
dθ
 =
 a4dR− a5dδ − a3da−b3da+ b4dζ + b5dφ+ b6dR + b7dδ + b8ds+ b9 sρdρ
−c3ds+ c5dL¯
 ,
(A.45)
where the determinant of the coefficient matrix is given by |A| = −a1b2c4 −
a2b10c1 + a1b10c2 + a2b1c4. By the correspondence principle |A| must be pos-
itive for the out of equilibrium adjustment path to be stable. Using this
equilibrium system and the information on the sign of the determinant, we
can derive the comparative static results which are given in table 1.13
13Note that the solution of the equilibrium was done with Mathematica 4.2. The note-
book with the code and further explanations concerning the determination of the signs of
the effects is available on request.
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A.4 The Social Planer’s Problem
Using the first order condition for the dynamic component of the social plan-
ner (controlling the optimal unemployment path), we get derive an expression
for (optimal) labour market tightness:
−φuL¯− µ2(1− η)θ−ηu = 0
⇔ µ2 = − φL¯
1− ηθ
η,
from which follows that µ2 is constant in a steady state. Moreover, we have:
−φθL¯− µ2(s+ θ1−η)− µ3L¯ = −µ˙2 + ρµ2
⇔ µ2 = 1
s+ θ1−η + ρ
(−φθL¯− µ3L¯)
Combining these two equations in order to eliminate µ2, we get:
1
s+ θ1−η + ρ
(−φθL¯− µ3L¯) = − φL¯
1− ηθ
η
⇔ φθ + µ3 = φ
1− ηθ
η(ρ+ s) +
φ
1− ηθ
⇔ θη = µ3
ρ+ s
1− η
φ
− η
ρ+ s
θ.
Turning to the static constraint, i.e. choosing quantity vs. variety once
the amount of filled vacancies is given. The two foc for this problem are
given by:
1
α
n
1−α
α ma−R− µ3m = 0
n
1
αa− δR− µ3n = 0,
where both can be modified to:
1
α
n
1
αma−Rn = mnµ3
n
1
αma− δRm = mnµ3.
Combining this yields:
1
α
n
1
αma−Rn = n 1αma− δRm
⇔ n
(
1
α
n
1
α
−1ma−R
)
= m
(
n
1
αa− δR
)
⇔
(
1
α
n
1
α
−1ma−R
)
=
m
n
(
n
1
αa− δR
)
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Assumption Slope Limiting Behaviour
α < 0.5 f ′(n) > 0 limn→0 f(n) = 0 limn→∞ f(n) =∞
α > 0.5 f ′(n) < 0 limn→0 f(n) =∞ limn→∞ f(n) = 0
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 g′(n) > 0 limn→0 g(n) = 0 limn→∞ g(n) =∞
α < 0.5 g′(n) > f ′(n)
Table 5: Properties of the equilibrium determining equations
A.5 Social Planer vs Decentral Equilibrium
Deriving the properties of the equilibrium variety determining equations
yields:
f(n) =
(
1
α
− 1
)
n
1
α
−1 L¯
n
a
f ′(n) =
1− α
α
f(n)
n
=
1− α
α
R
n
g(n) = an
1−α
α
((n
L¯
)α−1
−
(n
L¯
+ 1
)α−1)
g′(n) =
1− α
α
g(n)
n
+ an
1−α
α
(
(α− 1)
(n
L¯
)α−2
L¯−1 − (α− 1)
(n
L¯
+ 1
)α−2
L¯−1
)
=
R
n
+ an
1−α
α (α− 1)L¯−1
((n
L¯
)α−2
−
(n
L¯
+ 1
)α−2)
> 0
The properties of the two equations are summarized in table A.5.
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Figure 1: Structure of the Economy
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Figure 2: Product Variety in the Decentral and Social Optimum for different
α
